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Encountering Law’s Harm through Literary
Critique: An Anti-elegy of Land and
Sovereignty
Honni van Rijswijk
Abstract, This article focuses on the significance of practices of representa-
tion to law’s role in adjudicating harm  both the role of representation in the
adjudication of past harms, and in law’s present-day assertions of authority. I
focus in particular on the ways in which questions of harm to the person, rela-
tion to land, and sovereignty have been separated in law, and the effects of
these practices in constructing legal authority. I turn to Wright’s The Swan
Book (2013) to provide a reading of the “undoing” of narratives of harm based
on the person, and to thereby critique law’s representations of harm. I argue
that, as an anti-elegy in the Modernist tradition, Wright’s novel provides a
metaphor of harm and responsibility that reorganizes time, destabilizes law’s
claims to authority over the adjudication of harms, and queries law’s claim to
authority over other legal systems and sovereignties. This reading takes the
framework of harm beyond the personal, to include the violent histories that
have produced legal concepts including “land,” “sovereignty” and even “law”




tations of land, figure of the child
LAW’S VIOLENT JURISDICTIONS
This was the place where the mind of the nation practiced warfare
and fought nightly for supremacy, by exercising its power over other
people’s land.
This is where it begins as far as I am concerned. This is the quest to
regain sovereignty over my own brain.
(Alexis Wright, The Swan Book, 2013, p. 165 and 4)
Set in the post-apocalyptic landscape of 2088, and focalized through an Aborigi-
nal teenage girl, Oblivion Ethylene, nicknamed “Oblivia,” Alexis Wright’s novel The
Swan Book (2013) is a dystopic history of our future. The Swan Book unfolds in the
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Northern Territory within “the world’s most unknown detention camp,”1 where
Oblivia and her community live in the wake of catastrophic climate change and
widespread war. Oblivia has survived rape, environmental devastation, and con-
tinuing colonization. These intersecting harms are figured as “a virus”2 that invades
her mind and that she cannot eradicate. This article argues that by figuring such
harms to the person, to the land and to Aboriginal sovereignty in the genre of the
anti-elegy, The Swan Book offers a counter-imaginary to law’s representations of
harm. Law, I argue, has an elegiac structure: it figures harm as having occurred in
the past, as something to be resolved and put behind us, and consequently it has no
framework for allocating responsibility for continuing harms. In contrast, The
Swan Book’s representations of loss and harm are framed as ongoing conditions of
evisceration, which are a heightened but familiar version of our present. The novel
indexes major traumas of the 20th century, which have still to be resolved, and also
looks 70 years into the future, at a moment in which we are confronted with losses
that further exceed our frameworks of meaning. I argue that literary texts such as
Wright’s anti-elegy enable us to consider what an alternative framework of harm
might mean to law, and to the development of a jurisprudence of harm sufficient to
meet the losses of our present and our future.
Through practices that draw on the modernist tradition, as well as Aboriginal
lore, The Swan Book opens out from Oblivia’s trauma to offer a representation of
the interconnectedness of harms, providing a domain from which to question and
critique law’s genres. The anti-elegiac structure provides a framework within which
to connect questions of harm, agency and land, and to re-orient the question of harm
beyond a personal and even human framework. The novel thereby makes visible
law’s “jurisdictions” of representation, and the implicit claims to authority made
through law’s response to harms. Wright’s anti-elegy provides an alternative way
through loss, offering a form that questions law’s assumptions regarding the nature
and temporality of harms. It provides a framework of harm that is capable of more
completely representing harm in post-traumatic and postcolonial contexts, com-
pared to legal processes: of taking proper account of the violent histories that have
produced legal concepts such as “land,” “sovereignty” and even “law” itself  histo-
ries and contexts that are separated and obscured in law.
Reading The Swan Book as anti-elegy is a challenge to law’s claim to an exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the adjudication of violence, a claim that is central to under-
standing the constitution of law’s authority in modernity.3 This alternative reading
of harm is necessary if we are to understand law’s role in the adjudication of vio-
lence within the historical context of modernity and, since this is an Australian
archive, under postcolonial conditions  an understanding that involves tracing
law’s role in adjudicating violence through time. From the Enlightenment onwards,
law has been given a greater jurisdiction over violence, with increased social and
political expectations that acts of violence will be regulated through legislation, and
adjudicated in the courts. The recent past has seen the development of criminal and








































tort law into novel areas of culpability and suffering, as well as the development of
transitional justice processes designed to respond to the calamities of modernity.
But law’s role here is complex and implicated, and law’s adjudication of violence
can itself lead to further violence.4 Indeed, for Walter Benjamin, most law comes
from acts of genocidal exclusion. Acts of lawful violence are required for the continu-
ing formation of the state: “All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-pre-
serving,” and is “implicated in the problematic nature of law itself.”5 In modernity,
law’s assertion of a jurisdiction over harms has been central to the constitution of
its authority, and yet, through these adjudications, law’s own violence is height-
ened.6 In his later reading of Benjamin’s essay, Jacques Derrida focuses on those
moments in which “justice” is asserted as a response to violence. While these
moments are neither inherently “just nor unjust,” Derrida says, they are repre-
sented as just, through a “discourse of self-legitimation.”7 Representational practi-
ces are central to assertions of law’s jurisdictions  such acts are “said to found law
or state.”8 It is the control over the means of representation that is crucial, both to
the “emergence of justice”9 and to the violence that is inherent in these adjudica-
tions. Such legal and state narratives of violence and justice are also supported by a
teleological, causeeffect “homogenous [and] empty” temporality.10
In this essay, I am interested in how an emphasis on genre can deepen this anal-
ysis. Law’s assertion of jurisdiction over violence can be thought of as aggressive
realism. Law is aggressive in its assertion of an exclusive jurisdiction over violence,
making an implied claim that it alone can access the truth, punish offenders and
repair harms. Law’s assertion of jurisdiction is also representational, excluding
other genres and representational practices in responding to violence. We need
ways to encounter and intervene in the complexity of legal imaginaries of violence
and harm  imaginaries that are not available through law’s own accounts. The fol-
lowing reading of law through anti-elegy reveals law as representation, and more
particularly, as a genre produced through specific historical practices. Reading law
via anti-elegy also shows the effects of the teleological temporality that underpins
law’s claims to this authority.
A recent turn in the sub-discipline of law and literature has focused on the sig-
nificance of representation to the practice of criticism  particularly on ways in
which a literary reading becomes a mode of critique of law.11 Scholars in this area
have gone beyond thematic readings of texts to examine the roles of form, metaphor,
and narrative as modes of critique, and have given particular attention to the ways
in which critique can be thought of “as a problem of genre.”12 Here, genre is under-
stood not merely as a “stylistic device,” but as constituting (and revealing) ways of
being.13 Genres not only construct “schematic world[s]” with their own “definition
[s] of space, time, moral ethos, and players,”14 but can reveal something of how
worlds  including legal worlds  are created and maintained. Such a critique
introduces a degree of self-consciousness into our practices of representation, pro-
viding a way to think through subjectivity and authority. Certain genres and modes








































have the capacity to introduce a critical framework or sensibility, foregrounding
and making visible certain narratives as narratives, which would otherwise be
experienced as true and real.15 Engaging exemplary counter-texts in this mode pro-
vides a way to challenge law’s forms, not least through experiences of “affective dis-
sonance.”16 Modernist works are singled out as exemplars of this critical mode
because of their interest in, and critique of, histories and practices of representa-
tion, and their radical experiments with form.17 In particular, their critique of the
Enlightenment projects of philosophy and political thought hold a special relevance
to how we understand the history and experience of colonization. These Enlighten-
ment writings produced imaginaries and logics that justified Europe’s place in the
world; justified harms inflicted in the creation and protection of private property;
and animated the ways in which the colonial other was encountered.18
THE ANTI-ELEGY AS A MODE OF CRITIQUE
The classical elegy’s history moves from the Greeks through Shakespeare and into
modern and postmodern forms, wherein the elegy comes to mean something more
ruminative, cerebral, and darkly sublimating. The elegy works within a loss-conso-
lation paradigm, providing a structure through which to move with loss through
time, towards the resolution epitomized in the final line of John Milton’s “Lycidas”:
“Tomorrow to fresh woods and pastures new.”19 The elegy provides a social media-
tion of harm, and social critique is part of the “elegiac inheritance.”20 We can think
of law as having a classical elegiac structure: law figures harm as being located pri-
marily in the person, as having occurred in the past, and as being capable of resolu-
tion. Thomas Pfau argues that the elegiac is “the defining characteristic of aesthetic
production in Modernity,” a mode that increasingly influenced literature, art and
theory from the mid-18th century onwards.21 Pfau locates the power behind this
elegiac sensibility in a mourning of ideality, arising through disenchantment, espe-
cially with those practices of representation that supported Enlightenment logics
and rationalities.22 The significance of the elegiac is also due, Pfau argues, to mod-
ern temporality, present too, of course, in law, which, with its teleological approach,
institutes clear “programmatic breaks” with the past, bringing about what Benja-
min described as an “homogenous [and] empty” time that is inherently mournful.”23
The classical elegy was reworked by modernists as they sought new frameworks
and metaphors to respond to the violence of modernity, especially the rupturing
event of the Great War, which made existing representational forms seem redun-
dant.24 From Benjamin’s angel of history, to Freud’s theories of shock and psycho-
analysis, and on to the transitional justice processes after World War II, legal and
literary writers throughout the 20th century sought new forms to understand and
adjudicate modern violence.25
With its continuous-present temporality, and its refusal to offer resolution, the
anti-elegy form provides an alternative way through harm. If the classical elegy








































structured the resolution of loss, then the modernist anti-elegy explores, in the
words of Elizabeth Bishop, the “art of losing.”26 The modernist anti-elegy is charac-
terized by resistance to the normative process of resolution: in Jahan Ramazami’s
words, it entails “not so much solace as fractured speech, not so much answers as
memorable puzzlings.”27 Structurally, final closure is refused, and instead of loss
being transcended or redeemed, the reader continues to be immersed in loss, inhab-
iting a state of “resistant mourning.”28
The use of the anti-elegy as a structural device in the novel is exemplified in the
work of Virginia Woolf: Jacob’s Room (1922),29 To the Lighthouse (1927)30 and Mrs
Dalloway (1925).31 On the June 27, 1925, six weeks after the publication ofMrs Dal-
loway, Woolf wrote in her diary: “I have an idea that I will invent a new name for my
books to supplant ‘novel.’ A new [] by Woolf. But what? Elegy?”32 Woolf engaged
the anti-elegy to critique a number of social harms. Set in June 1923, Mrs Dalloway
focuses on a single day in which Septimus Smith, a young, shell-shocked veteran of
the war, is driven to suicide; his trauma is famously twinned with that of Clarissa
Dalloway, who is hosting a party, and who has experienced her share of hidden
losses. Instead of a conventional plot, characters are connected through their
elegiac relation to a multitude of losses. The literary scholar Tammy Clewell argues
that, “in her sustained effort to confront the legacy of the war, Woolf repeatedly
sought not to heal wartime wounds, but to keep them open.”33 This refusal to repre-
sent the Great War as a discrete and resolved event means that across these novels,
the war is not figured as exceptional  rather, war trauma is resituated as an exten-
sion of social institutions and everyday violence. Mrs Dalloway argues that, when
looking for the causes of war, it is important to look at empire and social institu-
tions, at the family, and civil society. Yet it is now difficult for us to fully access the
nature of Woolf’s project; the Great War, and even feminist projects of representa-
tion, have become familiar  we think we see these harms clearly. Her novels pro-
vide experiences of “affective dissonance,”34 of discord and rupture that provoke the
reader to reconsider what they think they know about harm and responsibility, and
about the significance of harm to civil society and its institutions.
Wright’s novels Plains of Promise (1997), Carpentaria (2006)35 and The Swan
Book (2013) all draw on this modernist legacy, but also update it and depart from
its concerns, moving into a domain that is uniquely postcolonial and even post-
human. Wright’s novels work to escape the “colonising spider’s trap door”36 of politi-
cal, legal and historical discourses, which assert an exclusive claim to represent
reality. Carpentaria and The Swan Book in particular engage both modernist and
indigenous representational practices and thematize the significance of practices of
representation to the constitution of authority, and to the legibility of harms.37
Even more than Carpentaria, The Swan Book rejects plot as an organizing struc-
ture. Instead, the narrative is held together through a connected recounting of
losses, the novel’s multiple points of view expressing a chorus of injuries. Oblivia’s
is the main consciousness of the novel. She has been mute ever since she was gang-








































raped as a young child by a group of petrol-sniffing youths. The loose plot of the
novel is based on her attempt to regain “sovereignty” over her own mind.38
The novel begins with the violent internal displacement of Aboriginal people.
Oblivia’s home is a rusted boat on the periphery of an Aboriginal community that
has been pushed onto a swamp and surrounded by government razor-wire. Hers is
just one of the many Aboriginal communities that have been targeted by the Austra-
lian army, which has been sent in “to intervene and control the will, mind and soul
of the Aboriginal people.”39 These harms are connected to those of a devastated
Europe, where “whole herds of deer [are] left standing like statues of yellow ice
while blizzards stormed.”40 The Europeans who flee this disaster by boat become
“the uncharted floating countries of condemned humanity,”41 and die at sea, “[m]en,
women and children captured forever in the ghost nets of zero geography.”42 Among
the European refugees is “the maddest person on Earth,” Aunty Bella Donna of the
Champions,43 a rare survivor who walks deep into the interior of Australia to find
Oblivia, and who cares for her for some time. In an effort to stay sane, Oblivia
befriends thousands of black swans who have come to live in the swamp, drawn
there by their own law. The novel shifts from the connected elegiac consciousness of
a dying world population to the point of view of the land, which is falling away. The
harms suffered by the land as a result of human action (climate change, war) pro-
voke the land to respond, and it has the authority to do so. Not only is the land, in
Christine Black’s terms, a “source of law,”44 but is also a grieving subject: “It was
land screaming with all of its life to the swans.”45 Land is excessive, rebellious and
law-making. Land rebels by producing plagues of rats, owls, butterflies and locusts,
which flourish and then are cut down; droughts kill Australia’s green coastal areas;
and floods overwhelm the continent’s desert centre.
ENCOUNTERING HARM BEYOND THE PERSON
The Swan Book’s anti-elegy disrupts law’s teleological narrative of violence through
an engagement with “the apocalypse” as a trope of harm, not only revealing law as
a particular genre, but also its purported claim over past/present/future. The apoca-
lypse has emerged as a significant figure in contemporary cultural and political life,
signifying the vanishing point of history, and marking a sublime moment in which
harm exceeds the explanatory capacity of humanist frameworks.46 But The Swan
Book refuses the exceptionalism of apocalyptic logic, bringing the apocalypse into
civic institutions and private life. Harm is represented not as a rupturing event, but
as continuous with the everyday: continuous with racism, assimilation, gender vio-
lence, and state law. We are not located in a world of eviscerated institutions and
frameworks. The post-apocalyptic world of the novel is continuous with ours; its
legal and social structures, and its institutions, are merely heightened versions of
our own. As the novel begins with this already devastated world, we are located in a
post-apocalyptic landscape, but with none of the “eventfulness” of an apocalypse.








































The Swan Book’s anti-elegy considers how representation has operated, and contin-
ues to operate, in the context of ongoing colonization; it engages the modernist proj-
ect of challenging Enlightenment categories and histories of representation.
Representations of state law, of army violence, of rape, of harms to asylum seekers,
and of environmental damage  all concerns of The Swan Book  are heavily medi-
ated by the histories of Western representational practices. The novel reveals and
critiques these practices.
One of Wright’s stated aims is to represent the continuing harms suffered by
Aboriginal people  to describe the “the living hell” of many Aboriginal lives.47
While Wright’s work provides a thematic critique of the harms of postcolonial Aus-
tralia, it also goes beyond thematic readings to connect questions of harm to ques-
tions of representation and authority. Her work asserts not only alternative claims
to truth from legal narratives, but also challenges the modes in which those truth
claims are made. By representing harm as a question of “sovereignty,” the novel
reveals law’s narrow representation of harm as relying on a specific kind of person-
hood, and offers an alternative to this framework. Oblivia is trying to “regain sover-
eignty over [her] own brain.”48 To imagine harm fully, the book requires us to go
beyond the framework of an individual victim to include the “mind” of colonization,
of the land, and of sovereignty. The concept of “the sovereignty of [the] mind”49 rep-
resents harm to the person as something that cannot be separated out from the
harm that has been done to land, animals, languages, sovereignties, cultures and
laws. The category of “person” is opened up, so that personhood  in this case,
Oblivia’s suffering subjectivity  is represented as an effect of land and law, as well
as of human violence. The novel foregrounds questions that are occluded by the
law, including the relationship of past harms to the present; the connection of
harms to the land to harms to the person; and law’s role in causing harm when it
responds to suffering. This broader perceptual framework challenges law’s violent
assertions of authority based on its claims to have an exclusive jurisdiction over
harms to Aboriginal populations, jurisdictions evidenced especially from the early
20th century to the present.
Between 1995 and 1997, an Australian federal government agency, the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), conducted an inquiry into
the 20th-century practices in which Aboriginal children were forcibly removed from
their parents.50 HREOC’s final report, Bringing Them Home, published in 1997,
found that from approximately 1910 to 1970, between one and three of every ten
indigenous children had been forcibly removed from their families, and that this led
to ongoing physical and psychological harms. Bringing Them Home found that
removals in the different states and territories were justified through a range of leg-
islative regimes, including “protectionist” legislation that was specific to Aborigi-
nes,51 and more general welfare-based legislation.52 In removing children, officials
often relied on claims of abuse or neglect, evidence for which was either not
required, or which was justified on the sole basis that the child was Aboriginal, or








































was living in poverty.53 A number of survivors of these removals gave evidence to
HREOC that they had not been abused or neglected, and some stated that they
were sent to foster homes or institutions which were much more violent and abusive
than their family of origin.54
This legal violence continues to be present in contemporary regimes. The North-
ern Territory Intervention was implemented following the publication of the Little
Children are Sacred Report (2007),55 following an Inquiry into child sexual abuse.56
Although the language of the legislation refers to Aboriginal welfare and wellbe-
ing,57 the Intervention legislation introduced measures that affect land rights, wel-
fare benefits, and access to services, issues that are essentially about power and
authority. The real suffering documented in Little Children Are Sacred is explained
in the subsequent legislation and surrounding public debates not as an effect of pov-
erty, structural racism or continuing colonization, or of the intergenerational effects
of past traumas caused by the state, such as those documented in Bringing Them
Home, but as effects of aberrant family structures, sex crimes, and by the effects of
pornography and alcohol. Claiming a role merely in the adjudication of harms tak-
ing place in Aboriginal communities, the state asserts its jurisdiction and thereby
inflicts harms on those communities. In doing so, it disguises its own violence. The
adjudication of harm against the individual becomes an occasion through which the
scope of “legitimate” violence by the state is in fact expanded.58
Wright’s anti-elegy provides a structure for harm that re-orients law’s assump-
tion (and the assumption of the classical elegy) that the figure of the individual
should necessarily be at the centre of understanding harm. It also demonstrates the
ways in which refusing this centrality makes visible harms that are otherwise dis-
guised in law. As a “little Aboriginal kid,”59 Oblivia holds a difficult position within
the Australian legal imaginary. It is impossible for her to tell the story of her rape 
by members of her own community  without that story being interpreted as a nar-
rative of community or familial dysfunction, and used as the occasion for yet more
state intervention. So Oblivia never tells the story of her rape. The harms she suf-
fers are never remedied; and the perpetrators are not brought to justice. Her story
does not fall within the genre of a trauma or healing narrative. Rather, The Swan
Book narrates harm from Oblivia’s position of representational impossibility. Refus-
ing the rape narrative, the novel explains Oblivia’s suffering through a world of
interconnecting environmental, political and legal harms: “like any other long-
standing conflict around the world, one act of violation becomes a story of anoth-
er.”60 To tell the story of her rape as an event set apart, as a matter of violence
between individuals, would omit the intersectionality of its causes  particularly
the interrelation of sexual violence with colonialism, poverty and structural racism.
It would also reinforce law’s habit of instrumentalizing violence  the history of
law’s violent interventions being justified on the basis of the story of one Aboriginal
subject harming another, a practice evident from the Aborigines Protection Acts of
the 20th century to the Northern Territory Intervention still in force.








































As an anti-elegiac text, The Swan Book leaves the psychoanalytic model of
trauma behind. The attack on Oblivia’s mind’s sovereignty is figured as a “cut snake
virus”61  interconnected, infectious, mutable, and uncontainable  in contrast to
the structural aesthetic of the psychoanalytic trauma paradigm, in which suffering
is contained within the person, and can be resolved. Oblivia says: “If you want to
extract a virus like this from your head  you can’t come to the door of its little old-
fashion prairie house with passe kinds of thinking […].”62 In the late 20th century,
trauma theorists such as Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub and Cathy Caruth extended
the psychoanalytic framework of trauma beyond the individual psyche to account
for the collective and intergenerational trauma of events such as the Holocaust.63
These theorists emphasize the role of representation in responding to trauma, and,
in particular, the role of the literary domain in finding new forms and frameworks
to make suffering legible, emphasizing the ways in which the representational
work of witnessing articulates historical losses. However, these theories and
responses do not fully account for the harms of dispossession caused by the history
of settler colonialism, and through continuing colonial techniques. The harms of col-
onization call for different kinds of legal and ethical responses from those modeled
on rupturing, traumatic events such as war: clear events with a start and a finish.
The harms of colonization instead develop through accretion.
The quasi-judicial, transitional justice process of the HREOC Inquiry and the
subsequent Bringing Them Home Report tried to find new forms to respond to
harm, and psychoanalytic frameworks were central to this process. Bringing Them
Home explicitly drew on the experiences of the Shoah Foundation, and its belief in
the significance of testimony to the process of healing and resolution.64 The Report’s
framing narrative begins with the transgressions of violence and removal, and ends
with the resolution of harms and obligations, in which “all are sorted back into their
proper places and all debts are paid.”65 Bringing Them Home’s narrative of tracing
a journey home, suggesting that all journeys and losses return to the same place,
imposes closure on a process that necessarily cannot (and should not) be closed.66
This narrative has the effect of separating out “events” of forced removal of children
from their ongoing context, and creates a false distance between policies of past and
present. Policies regarding the Stolen Generations are better understood as a series
of ongoing practices.67 The emphasis in the work of Bringing Them Home is on wit-
nessing harm through these narratives. The Swan Book uses very different strate-
gies. The reader is blocked from a sentimental identification with Oblivia. We do
not have ongoing access to her mind; and we are not taken on a journey of healing
or resolution. As a number of scholars have noted, transitional justice responses
such as Bringing Them Home tend to be framed through a particular genre  that
of the sentimental68  and even, in Robert Meister’s terms, of “melodrama.”69 Far
from encouraging experiences of “affective dissonance,”70 Meister argues that tran-
sitional justice is a genre through which witnesses engage in a problematic self-
focused ethics, which is evidenced as sentimentality. The power in this argument








































lies in its analysis of the vesting of authority: it is neither the victim nor the perpe-
trator but rather the beneficiary who becomes the main figure addressed and inter-
pellated through the melodrama, who “can understand themselves as bystanders
who are capable of feeling compassion without fear.”71 And of course, it is the
nation-state that is at the heart of the process, the authority given the power to
adjudicate the meaning of past suffering. Such aesthetic practices produce the Aus-
tralian nation as a nation of benevolent bystanders and beneficiaries regarding the
harms of the past. Non-indigenous Australians become interpellated into a relation-
ship with indigenous Australians through their own demonstrations of bystander
compassion, rather than through responsible and responsive action. The Swan
Book, however, refuses to employ the sentimental figure of the child. Oblivia is not
a traumatized subject set apart from her environment, but shown to be an effect of
intersecting processes, which include the legal and social institutions of the white
state. Wright rewrites the concept of the “mind” that suffers harm, showing that
the history of land, law, and sovereignty are inseparable from personal suffering.
READING AUTHORITY AND LAND AS CENTRAL TO HARM
By rejecting the traditional elegiac narrative of normative healing, The Swan Book
opens up other means of engaging with loss, offering a new way of understanding
land and its discursive production in Australian law. As a concept, “land” is innately
connected to past and present personal harms inflicted on Aboriginal people, as well
as to the harms that have been done to their laws and sovereignty. Australian legal
concepts of property and title have been produced through the processes of coloniza-
tion  through the harms inflicted on Aboriginal people, and through harms
inflicted on the land itself. But law’s focus on land as property, on the technicalities
of title and interests, and its reduction of sovereignty to matters of territory, means
that land’s relation to this violence is disguised. The harms of assimilation, includ-
ing those suffered by the Stolen Generations, are adjudicated separately from
Native Title claims regarding land and title, although they are innately imbricated.
In Australia, Native Title has been the domain in which Aboriginal sovereignty is
encountered (and then displaced) in the common law. In these cases, state law has
read Aboriginal sovereignty as finite and as superseded, law refusing to entertain
the possibility of a plurality of sovereignties and laws.72 At best, Aboriginal law is
recognized as having been supported by a sovereignty that once existed, but which
has no authority now. Following these failed encounters between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal laws, Aboriginal authority becomes coded not as law, but as
“custom.”73
In The Swan Book, land and harm are deeply imbricated, and the land becomes
a grieving, sometimes vengeful subject. When the ecology changes, the narrator
asks whether it is Law, “doing something to the country?”74 When the plagues
begin, the “law spirits” begin travelling the country, trying to “keep the balance.”75








































Animal life and land are agents who suffer, make law, and attest to a different
authority from that of the state. To understand Oblivia’s suffering means to mourn
land and animals, laws, language and culture; and also to understand that land,
animals and laws mourn. The Swan Book expands the web of grief, fusing and
implicating the blindness of Western law, the violence of the Intervention, and the
desecration of the environment.
At present, there is no space in state law for Aboriginal authorities to adjudicate
either present claims of violence in Aboriginal communities, or the historical claims
of the Stolen Generations. These claims are solely heard according to state law.
There have only been a handful of cases dealing with compensation for survivors of
the Stolen Generations, and only one has succeeded.76 In cases such as Cubillo77
and Trevorrow,78 harms are framed as only personal, and as disconnected from
communities’ removal from their land, and from their laws, thereby failing to prop-
erly account for the policies of assimilation that motivated child removals  policies
that went to the heart of Aboriginal sovereignty, and to Aboriginal rights to land.79
These occlusions mean that the connection between past and present state practices
regarding Aboriginal subjects are also more difficult to see. The state has targeted
Aboriginal sovereignty, and then erased this violence from the legal record.
In The Swan Book, as in the earlier Carpentaria, state law is represented not as
a general source of authority but as a particular assertion of authority represented
through a particular genre, contextualized alongside and against Aboriginal legal
authorities that are also operating within Australian territory. The world of The
Swan Book is animated by multiple laws and authorities. The swans move around
the country, “following stories for country that had been always known to them”
because “Swans had Law too,”80 they have their own “Law scriptures.”81 The land-
scape is permeated by “law spirits” who “scrutinize” the country.82 The country has
“law music,” brought up by “old powerful chants.”83 Law is innately bound up with
the materiality of the landscape. Men and women are “keepers of Country,” belong-
ing “wholly” to “old laws” of Country;84 they “were Country.”85 The novel’s thick
description of intersecting authorities and laws produces a version of Australia that
is plural and post-national. This plurality is emphasized by The Swan Book’s use of
genre, as questions of harm and authority are represented in a number of different
modes, placed side by side. Loss is registered in tones alternatively mournful, come-
dic, vengeful and horrific. There are realist details and descriptions, and realist rep-
resentations of characters, but there are also multiple excesses to this mode. The
fantastical is evoked as the child Oblivia sleeps inside a Eucalyptus tree for ten
years, like “Rip van Winkle,”86 and a pet monkey is abandoned after “predicting
colossal wars that started to frighten the life out of everyone.”87 The dystopic is rep-
resented by the violent upending of the nation’s weather patterns: the weather has
“flipped sides, swapping southern weather with that of the north”;88 and black
swans have migrated to the north of Australia, where they have never lived before.
The epic is evoked as refugees are led from a European mountaintop by a holy white








































swan, who whispers “a greeting of good day and good fortune.”89 The swan guides
the refugees to the water and across the seas. And the anti-elegy is evoked as the
losses of the world increase, and are noted and honored, as the novel progresses.
The novel adopts a critical self-consciousness regarding its status as representation,
which law as a genre rejects.
Dorsett and McVeigh suggest that in Australian law, “[s]overeignty is a matter
of authority, and of submission to authority, and it is inextricably linked to terri-
tory.”90 Wright’s anti-elegy opens up an alternative reading of Australian authority
and sovereignty, which explains the production of sovereignty not only through ter-
ritory, but also through past and continuing harms. Wright’s anti-elegy connects
the history of invasion, and the violence that was committed against Aboriginal
laws and land, to harms in the present, refusing the “homogenous […] empty time”
of state law.91 The Swan Book’s temporality works against the linear time of moder-
nity, representing the relationship between law, authority and violence as continu-
ous, rather than through discrete periods of past, present, and future.
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A 21ST-CENTURY JURISPRUDENCE OF HARM
Oblivia fails to regain her sovereignty. Losses only intensify as the novel progresses:
Bella Donna dies; Warren Finch is assassinated; and nearly all the swans Oblivia
has loved are taken. Oblivia moves back to the swamp where she originated, hold-
ing the broken body of the last remaining swan. Then time shifts again and she
appears as a haunting figure who may or not still be living. When the novel ends,
she is still possessed by the virus, leaving her, and the world, in a continuing state
of harm. In contrast, law employs rigid frameworks for resolution that insist on a
break with the past. Even the transitional and human rights processes that have
attempted more creative forms to respond to catastrophe have failed to move away
from this problematic temporality of resolution. For Meister, the main tropes of
these processes, including reconciliation and redemption, have an affective logic
that is about “buying more time” for beneficiaries, buying more time “after evil” but
“before justice.”92 Anne Orford contends that transitional justice processes are
“centrally concerned” with time;93 she argues that the Bringing Them Home report
produces a narrative of closure, a view of “a unified past and a shared future within
the liberal democratic nation-state.”94 The anti-elegiac form provides a metaphor
that frames harms as both proximate and continuing, rather than as distant and in
the past. It leaves resolution as an open question, and demands ways of relating to
harm in the present. The anti-elegy provides a form to meet harms that focuses on
process, contingency and possibility, in contrast to law’s genre of aggressive real-
ism, which fails to take into account its relation to representation.The Swan Book
provides a domain in which to critique, encounter and re-vision legal imaginaries of
harm. Moving the framework of harm beyond the person weakens law’s violent
jurisdictions, and loosens law’s aggressive representational practices that go to the








































heart of law’s authority. These deconstructive practices can themselves be thought
of as essentially anti-elegiac in mode, “locating the very possibility of reading and
writing in an impossible desire for presence, completion, and coherence […].”95 We
need a 21st-century jurisprudence that rethinks legal relation through a new model
of harm  one that reorganizes the category of personal harm by contextualizing
the human in relation to law, land and sovereignties, and comprehends the specific
histories through which law has enacted judgment, and through which law contin-
ues to act. This strategy is imperative if we are ever to develop a jurisprudence of
legal relation and authority in continuing colonial contexts, not to mention the con-
text of the Anthropocene era, in which we can anticipate unprecedented human-
caused harm to the land.96
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